

# TRANSPORT SECURITY GUIDELINES

AIGA 043/07

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# Acknowledgement

This document is adopted from the European Industrial Gases Association document EIGA 913/05 'Transport security guidelines'. Acknowledgement and thanks are hereby given to EIGA for permission granted for the use of their document.

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#### 1 Introduction

Security has always been a concern of gas companies seeking to keep their goods and assets from being stolen. The recent development of international terrorism has however, heightened the awareness that companies should do more. AIGA's first response was given in its publication AIGA 003/04 Security Guidelines which still remains current. The latest development is the inclusion of security provisions in the 2005 edition of the ADR and this document seeks to explain to members how to implement these new requirements.

The guidelines are given in two parts; Chapters 4 applies to all gases carried in quantities above the threshold of 1.1.3.6 of ADR. Additional requirements apply for high consequence dangerous goods (see definition) and guidance on these is given in Chapter 5. These chapters are structured under the sub-headings People, Procedures and Property. Numbers in brackets at the end of paragraph headings refer to the applicable paragraph of ADR. Additionally, an example of a security plan for high consequence dangerous goods is shown in Appendix 1.

# 2 Scope and purpose

This document provides guidance for AIGA members on complying with the requirements of the Security Provisions set out in Chapter 1.10 of ADR 2005 when carrying dangerous goods of Class 2 (gases), but it does not cover national requirements which must also be observed. The security requirements of ADR and the recommendations of this document only apply when carrying goods above the quantities specified in paragraph 1.1.3.6 of ADR. Extra requirements apply to high consequence dangerous goods (toxic gases and bulk flammable gases — see definition 3.2). Members may choose to apply these extra requirements to those non-high consequence gases which may be at high risk of theft, for example gases used in the production of drugs (e.g. hydrogen in cylinders) or used as recreational drugs (e.g. nitrous oxide).

The document covers the transport of dangerous goods by road; other modes of transport are not considered. Transport includes receiving dangerous goods onto members' premises and the whole process of supplying dangerous goods to customers. It includes security during the whole time that the goods are on the vehicle and in temporary storage en route.

#### 3 Definitions

Security (ADR 1.10 Note)

For the purposes of this document and in accordance with ADR Chapter 1.10, security means measures or precautions to be taken to minimise theft or misuse of dangerous goods that may endanger persons, property or the environment.

High Consequence Dangerous Goods (ADR Table 1.10.5)

High consequence dangerous goods means:

- all flammable gases when carried in tanks, battery vehicles or MEGS (multi element gas containers), of more than 3000 litres water capacity.
- all toxic gases in any aggregated quantity exceeding 20 kg when liquefied (50 kg for ammonia and chlorine) or 20 litres water capacity when compressed. These lower limits are those of 1.1.3.6.
- for goods of other classes, consult table 1.10.5 in ADR (see Annex 2).

#### ADR/RID:

European agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road (ADR) and rail (RID)

For details on ADR 2005 refer to website:

http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/adr/adr2005/05ContentsE.html

#### 4 General Requirements for all dangerous goods

### 4.1 People

#### 4.1.1 Recruitment

#### a) Appropriate Persons

Organisations should ensure all employees who are involved with the transport of dangerous goods are suitable for the task and that they hold verifiable:

- licences, certificates and operating documents where applicable; and
- permission to work in the country of operation.

Warn applicants that giving false information, or failing to disclose material information, would be grounds for a refusal to interview or, if employed – dismissal.

Companies should also regularly verify any licences, certificates and operating documents that staff may need to do their job.

#### b) Employment checks

You should check the employment record of everyone involved in the transport of dangerous goods. You should get documentary evidence of background and experience for all potential employees. Insist on original documents to check identity and qualifications.

Wherever possible you should get a continuous record of the applicant's education and employment history covering at least the previous five years.

Refer to EIGA document 54/03 for further guidance on the selection of drivers.

### 4.1.2 Selecting contractors

Contractors involved in the transport of dangerous goods should undertake the same pre-employment screening process (4.1.1) as for your own employees. The user company should ask them to demonstrate, from their records, that they have carried out these checks. If they fail to do so, the employing company should consider using a different contractor.

Organisations shall ensure that there are appropriate checks or screening of contractors or subcontractors or agency staff employed in key positions, such as security guards at site access points, drivers, handling and filling staff.

Another good practice is to ensure that you have procedures to confirm that a person sent by a contractor or agency is indeed the individual who turns up.

#### 4.1.3 Training (ADR 1.10.2)

#### a) Training and awareness

Companies should provide security awareness training for everyone involved in the carriage of dangerous goods. You should periodically supplement initial training with refresher training. The training should deal with:

- the nature of security risks;
- recognising security risks;
- how to minimise security risks and
- what to do in the event of a security breach.

The training should also include awareness of security plans (if appropriate). This should be at a level appropriate to the responsibilities of individuals and their part in implementing security plans.

The employer should record all security training and make the records available to the employee if asked.

#### b) Driver training

Brief drivers on what to do in the event of hijack or criminal attack. Drivers should see security as a normal, daily routine in the workplace. Emphasise that they must not put themselves at risk in an attempt to protect the vehicle and load.

The depth of the training will depend upon the type of goods carried

#### 4.2 Procedures

#### 4.2.1 Management routines and secure working practices (ADR 1.10.1.1 and 1.10.1.2)

There are a number of routines that company managers can adopt to improve security.

Managers should:

- constantly review operational procedures;
- · consider possible risks and always bear security measures in mind;
- keep documentation about the load in a secure place. Criminals could use consignment documentation to show they have title to the goods;
- keep all vehicle/premises keys in a secure place. Managers should develop secure practices for controlling keys to vehicles and premises;
- instruct drivers to secure the cab and where appropriate the load compartment. Where possible, they should lock cab doors when loading or unloading and
- advise them not to talk about their load or intended route in a public place or over the radio. They should be careful when asking people for directions or advice on off-road parking.

It is good practice to draw up a security policy statement. This should set down general principles for the secure operation of vehicles and the serious view taken of dishonesty, irresponsibility or negligence.

Consignors should offer dangerous goods only to carriers that have been appropriately identified. Do not rely only on uniforms as a means of verifying identity of persons collecting dangerous goods.

#### 4.2.2 Security co-ordinator

One person should have full responsibility for the whole security planning process. This person should have sufficient authority to direct the response to security threats. They should also be involved in the planning and design of the site's exterior security, access control and so on. If your company has several sites you may wish to appoint one person with overall responsibility for security but also several site-based security co-ordinators.

# 4.2.3 Lorry/truck parking

Transport companies frequently look for details of lorry/truck parking facilities, particularly 'secure' lorry/truck parking.

Rather than identify individual lorry/truck parks as secure or otherwise, the following features should be considered:

- 24 hour guarding;
- · video system;
- fenced off parking;
- floodlighting and

#### 4.2.4 Maintaining security procedures

Security should be part of the daily routine for all staff involved with the transport of dangerous goods. Train your drivers, warehouse and yard staff in the right habits and make security part of their work.

Make sure that you have clearly formulated standards of responsibility and performance. These need to be understood and accepted by everyone involved in vehicle operations. You could instruct new staff in the security measures applicable to their duties as part of their induction training.

Check regularly that drivers understand and use the security equipment fitted to their vehicles. The same goes for security equipment on premises.

Companies should arrange regular checks to ensure that all security equipment and control measures are functioning correctly. Above all don't 'fit and forget'.

Keep up-to-date with current security developments and discuss any problems with the company's security co-ordinator, local police contacts and others in the industry. Make use of actual events and the experience of others.

#### 4.2.5 Journeys

#### a) Security on the road - drivers

Drivers should report anything unusual to the relevant manager. It is recommended that they have some means to communicate with a responsible person (e.g. mobile phone, 2-way radio, etc.)

#### Advise drivers to:

- where appropriate, remove the ignition keys, lock the cab doors and switch on any alarm or immobiliser whenever they have to leave the vehicle unattended, even when going to pay for fuel or making a delivery;
- refuel on site before setting off whenever possible;
- pre-plan their route and avoid stopping for any reason not to do with their work such as shopping for personal items;
- never leave windows open when away from the vehicle;
- use pre-planned, secure and approved overnight parking facilities where possible.
- lock all doors while sleeping in the cab;
- never carry unauthorised passengers and
- never leave the vehicle unattended in an unobserved or unlit area at night. Try to keep the vehicle in sight and be able to return to it quickly if it must be left unattended;

#### b) Security on the road – drivers procedures (ADR 1.10.1.4)

The driver shall carry a formal identity document with photograph. Types of identification may include valid driving licence/permit, passport or a photo ID issued by the driver's employer or other organisation.

# 4.2.6 Reporting security incidents

If there is a security incident, if a vehicle or a vehicle's load is stolen or you have suspicions regarding a possible security situation, the police shall be called. Drivers shall alert the relevant manager(s).

AIGA members shall report the incident to SAG, once the nature and outcome of the security incident has been confirmed.

#### 4.3 Property

No specific recommendations are currently being made – members are advised to follow normal practices for the protection of their vehicles and sites.

### 5 Requirements for high consequence dangerous goods

#### 5.1 People – high consequence dangerous goods

#### 5.1.1 Dangerous Goods Safety Advisor (ADR 1.8.3.3)

DGSAs are given only one specific role in the ADR's security requirements. They must satisfy themselves that a security plan exists. They are not required to see the plan or participate in its development, nor are they required to audit compliance with the plan. Companies may well choose to involve their DGSA in meeting their security requirements, but this would be because of their knowledge or responsibilities, not due to any legal requirement.

#### 5.1.2 Existing employees in highly sensitive areas

Employers may need to consider the following items in relation to employees in jobs with a significant impact on the security of transport operations.

- Ensure that you have similar information on file for existing staff as for new employees See 4.1.1.
- Check and update the information regularly.

If it raises any security-related questions you should take these up with the individual concerned in the first instance.

#### 5.1.3 Driver training (ADR 1.10.2)

The training programme for drivers should include the following elements.

- Security measures and procedures for the vehicle, load and company premises. It should specifically prohibit unauthorised person(s) in the cab and include guidance to drivers on theft of their load by deception.
- Instruction in the driver's security role, including how to use the security equipment fitted to the vehicle and at the company's premises, where appropriate.
- Hijack awareness and avoidance.
- · Reporting suspicious events.

# 5.2 Procedures – high consequence dangerous goods

#### 5.2.1 Management routines and secure working practices

Sites receiving or consigning high consequence dangerous goods should:

- schedule vehicle deliveries or collections, wherever possible, so that the arriving vehicle can be cross-referenced against the expected vehicle schedule held at the gatehouse;
- identify the driver and vehicle and
- for those substances identified as having a particularly high risk (e.g. substances with an LC<sub>50</sub> less than 200 vppm), give the customer/receiver an estimated time of arrival, which should be within a reasonable period of the intended delivery time.

#### 5.2.2 Communication with staff

Make sure that all staff involved with the transport of high consequence dangerous goods understand the need for heightened security measures. Employees are more likely to be reassured than alarmed by such measures.

Companies should have a system of communication that allows all staff to report anything suspicious. Consider setting up a confidential reporting system.

Investigate any reports of suspicious behaviour and consider reporting them to the police.

#### 5.2.3 Security plans (ADR 1.10.3.2)

Carriers, consignors and others engaged in the transport of high consequence dangerous goods should adopt, implement and comply with a security plan.

The plan should identify and reduce security risks related to the transport of dangerous goods. It should take account of the types and amounts of dangerous goods transported and how they are transported.

It should cover at least the elements listed in ADR 1.10.3.2.2 (see Appendix 2).

Consignors should ascertain themselves that carriers have a security programme in place.

#### 5.2.4 Security plans – the three steps (ADR 1.10.3.2)

There are three steps in drawing up security plans.

#### a) Step one:

Identify the types of threat. Examples are:

- Hijacking of vehicles in transit
- Theft from vehicles when parked either at base or during deliveries
- Supplying dangerous materials to those who will misuse it.

The identification of threats should be aided by reference to the following considerations:

- What does the news say about the current national and international climate, or current terrorist campaigns?
- Are there any relevant previous events?
- What is police advice on the chance of a terrorist attack in the organisation's area of operations?
- Is there something about the organisation's building, operations or staff that could attract the attention of terrorists?

#### b) Step two:

Identify the products and equipment involved and in particular how they are vulnerable to terrorist attack or passing into the wrong hands.

#### c) Step three:

Identify what you should do to reduce the risk to an acceptable level (it will not be possible to eliminate risk altogether).

At the end of step three you should have a security plan. An example of a plan is given in Appendix 1.

#### 5.2.5 Security plan – implementation

Once plans are made:

- keep them under review so that they reflect changes in supply routes and methods, and personnel;
- test them, by holding regular exercises;
- audit them to ensure that they are still current and workable.

#### 5.2.6 Records

You should keep the following information for all transactions involving a high consequence substance. You should keep these records for the period recommended by the national authority and make them available to the appropriate authorities on request:

- a) name and address of the consignee;
- b) name of the high consequence substance;
- c) quantity of the high consequence substance; and;
- d) date of supply.

#### 5.2.7 Precautions when taking orders

A sales policy for certain high consequence dangerous goods shall be in place. The document AIGA 003/04 section 5.8 gives details.

#### 5.2.8 Security on the road - drivers

Drivers carrying high consequence dangerous goods shall:

- carry out a walk-around security check of the vehicle before departing a company site or customer. This includes stops where the vehicle is left unattended during rest/break periods;
- contact base whenever they encounter any delay, problem or change in consignment details. The driver should not change the pre-agreed routing without prior confirmation from base and
- avoid leaving trailers or containers unattended, whether loaded or not. Where possible for longstay parking use pre-agreed parking areas with approved security devices fitted and fully operational (see 4.2.3).

Drivers should keep their cab doors closed and locked throughout the journey. Where possible tanker and battery vehicle cabinets or the vehicle's load space should also be kept locked.

Drivers should be instructed not to stop on the road unless required to by a police or other body with the authority to stop vehicles.

#### 5.2.9 Communications and pre-alerts

Vehicles should be fitted with mobile telephones or some other means of two-way communications between the driver and the base. They allow the driver to contact base on arrival at an unoccupied site or to report any suspicious activity and the carrier to keep track of route changes and any overnight parking sites used.

#### 5.2.10 Access procedures

Employers can reduce the 'insider' risk by limiting the access individual employees have to key locations, assets and information to which they need to do their job. This can be done in various ways, depending on the nature of the business.

### Examples include:

physically controlling access to locations housing high consequence dangerous goods.

• protecting business-sensitive information, whether in hard copy (by, for example, locking it up securely) or soft copy (using access controls on IT systems).

Unexpected vehicles should be refused entry to a site, until their identity and proof of need for entry has been confirmed – see 5.2.1.

# 5.3 Property - high consequence dangerous goods

This section covers measures to improve security at sites and on vehicles used for the transport of high consequence dangerous goods. The list is not prescriptive and members should make their choices based upon their specific risk assessments.

#### 5.3.1 Sites

Although the ADR is concerned with transport, dangerous goods on vehicles parked at their home base are within its scope. Site security is therefore relevant to compliance. For site security measures, AIGA members should refer to the document AIGA 003/04.

#### 5.3.2 Vehicles

#### a) Vehicle and trailer records

Details of vehicles, trailers and loads should be available quickly in case the police need them. Keep a daily record of each vehicle's movements with precise details of the load and the driver on each occasion.

### b) Vehicles security measures

Vehicles may be secured by means of a range of additional security measures. Manufacturers are producing increasingly sophisticated equipment, often running off the vehicle management system. When purchasing new equipment consider the anti-theft equipment and other security devices offered by the vehicle manufacturer.

If feasible and required by the risk assessment, anti-theft equipment may be fitted to existing vehicles. Physical security of commercial vehicles can take the form of additional or stronger high security locks, grilles, bulkheads and the like.

Steering column locks are incorporated into virtually all vehicles during manufacture. However, professional criminals can quickly overcome factory-fitted steering locks. Other forms of additional security and immobilisation should therefore be fitted such as:

- Fuel valve immobilisers;
- Starter motor immobilisation;
- Immobilisation of braking systems;
- Wheel clamps and
- Articulated trailer immobilisation kingpin/trailer leg locks

#### c) Tracking systems (ADR 1.10.3.3 NOTE)

Tracking systems are not, strictly speaking, anti-theft devices. But they can help in deterring theft and recovering vehicles, where time is often of the essence. Use transport telemetry or other tracking methods or devices to monitor the movement of high consequence dangerous goods where appropriate.

# Appendix 1 Example of a security plan in accordance with 1.10.3.2 ADR

What follows is an example of how a particular site might write its security plan to address the security risks it has identified. AIGA members should adapt the requirements to their own circumstances, equipment and security situation.

NOTE— The headings in boxes are based on the text in section 1.10.3.2.2 of ADR/RID. All these elements shall be addressed in the security plan.

Company : XXXXXXXXX

Site / Location : YYYYYYYYY

#### A) Allocation of responsibilities regarding security

In addition to the duties that appointees and other persons had to fulfil prior to 1<sup>st</sup> January 2005 the following additional tasks shall be performed in accordance with chapter 1.10 ADR/RID

The following functions apply to the location:

Function	Name, First Name
Consignor or Freight Forwarder	XXX, YYY
Loader / Shipping Agent	XXX, YYY
Filler	XXX, YYY
Carrier	XXX, YYY

Based on their job description and/or their assignment, the above mentioned employees are responsible for security.

#### A.1 Consignor or Freight Forwarder

Only those carriers who fulfil the requirements for carriers are used.

# A.2 Loader / Shipping Agent (Transport of unit load)

The loader has to ensure that only products stated on the delivery note are handed over to drivers who have proven their identity.

If in addition to contractual carriers, subcontractors are also used, it has to be ensured that the driver of the vehicle that is to be loaded is in possession of a written loading order.

# A.3 Filler (tank-vehicle, battery-vehicle)

The Filler has to ensure, that only products defined within delivery note/ transport documents are filled into approved tank-or battery vehicles are handed over to designated drivers.

#### A.4 Carriers

All carriers have to observe the rules that are listed under "C", "D" and "H".

#### A.5 Other Persons

All other employees (filler, staff of shipping and transport department) have to observe the measures listed under "E" and have to be trained accordingly.

B) Record of dangerous goods or types of dangerous goods concerned

In accordance with table 1.10.1 (ADR) class 2 materials with the following properties are:

F flammable T toxic

TF toxic, flammable
TC toxic, corrosive
TO toxic, oxidizing

TFC toxic, flammable, corrosive toxic, oxidizing, corrosive

C) Assessment of the current operations and the security risk associated with these

The transport of class 2 goods (gases) bears the risk of theft, both that of a single gas cylinder or container or tank and of a complete load or vehicle including tanker or battery vehicle.

#### C.1) Loading and unloading

In order to minimize the risk of a vehicle being stolen during loading / unloading (also at customer site) it is necessary to take out the ignition key and to lock the driving cab.

To make theft of pallets within packaged goods transport more difficult, the driver ought to take out the ignition key of the FLT if he has to leave the vehicle unattended for a period of time.

A special case in this respect exists, when a haulier is loading gas cylinders. For this purpose special rules are drawn up between haulier / (and) xxxxx to prevent theft.

#### C.2.) Parking

When the driver has to park the vehicle during rest periods or stop at petrol stations, he/she shall. lock the cab and activate the anti-theft device.

# C.3.) Packaging / Labelling

From today's point of view no further dangers/risk can be assumed within the scope of these functions within the framework of chapter 1.10. ADR/RID that are not already mentioned in the rest of the rules and regulations of ADR / RID.

#### C.4.) Miscellaneous

In addition to the prevention of theft of a vehicle or pallet in case of packaged goods transport as mentioned in paragraph C1 and C2, the protection of individual gas cylinders during a stop during which the vehicle cannot be permanently watched, is to be considered. As it is of highest priority after an accident to clear the damage (to separate the load/ separate possibly leaking cylinders), the theft of individual cylinders with toxic content can only be made more difficult by preventing immediate access to the opening mechanisms of the pallets (pallet clamp/,ratchet of lashing strap (load securing strap) through positioning of the relevant cylinders towards the middle of the loading area or to position the pallets as close as possible to each other to make theft of individual cylinders more difficult.

When goods are transported via tanker or battery vehicle it has to be ensured that the cabinet is secured during a stop during which the vehicle cannot be permanently watched. Therefore the cabinet shall be locked at all times (except during loading and unloading).

D) Measures to minimise the security risks

#### D.1) Training:

Employee awareness training regarding security

- theft and abuse
- awareness
- procedures to minimise the risk

#### D.2) Security policy

New employees have to present a clearance certificate, drivers have to have a qualifications certificate or proof of passing of a *test based on SUG/SÜFV* 

It is important to observe the requirements for hauliers before signing haulier contracts.

D.3) When an employee is transferred from one job to another he has to receive relevant training. It is especially important to draw the attention of employees with many years' standing who take up a new job after being transferred to the potential risks which are described in chapter 1.10 ADR/RID (see also paragraph D.1).

#### D.4) Choice and use of routes:


This is covered in national legislation. Further restrictions are not possible because of the supplier / customer locations.


#### D.5) Use of equipment

In order to prevent access to the transported goods or to at least make access difficult, it is important to strictly adhere to the measures regarding security as stipulated in ADR chapter 7.5 (especially securing the load). (lashing strap, side- and tail- boards, locks)

E) Procedure for reporting threats, security breaches or incidents connected with these occurrences and the actions that have to be taken.

During the legally required training all employees are instructed to report all threats, unauthorised access to site/location to the site manager.





Site Manager

name, location telephone number XXXXXXXXX YYYYYYYYY ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ F) Procedure to assess and test the security plans and procedures for recurring test and updating of the plans.

The site manager shall draw up the security plans. He shall send a copy of the plans to the dangerous goods safety advisor who shall check the security plans as required in the dangerous goods laws. The security plans of the individual areas / locations shall be checked at least once a year to ensure that all information is up-to-date. Especially organisation charts and telephone numbers shall be checked.

Responsibility for this measure lies with the site manager.

G) Measures that ensure that the information about transportation contained in the security plan are inaccessible for unauthorised persons

In order to ensure that no unauthorised person gains access to the information contained in the security plan, the original of this plan has to be locked away by the signatory of the safety plan. The copy of the dangerous goods advisor will be kept locked centrally.

H) Measures that ensure that the information about transportation procedures contained in the safety plan are only distributed to persons who need this information

All persons involved in the transportation process (particularly dispatcher and carrier) will be instructed (during the training) not to grant unauthorised persons access to the transport documents (delivery note, packing list) or even hand them over to these persons.

Date, location		:		
Site manager	:			

# Appendix 2 Security provisions introduced in ADR 2005

#### **Exemption for Small Loads**

1.1.3.6.2 Add a new indent to read as follows: "- Chapter 1.10;"

# Chapter 1.3 Training Scope and applicability

1.3.1 Add the following sentence at the end: "Training requirements specific to security of dangerous goods in Chapter 1.10 shall also be addressed."

# Chapter 1.8 Checks and Support Measures Spot Checks (new words shown underlined)

1.8.1.1 The competent authorities of the Contracting parties may, on their national territory, at any time, conduct spot checks to verify whether the requirements concerning the carriage of dangerous goods have been met <u>including</u>, in accordance with 1.10.1.5, those concerning security measures.

# Safety Adviser (new words shown underlined)

- 1.8.3.3 The adviser's duties also include monitoring the following practices and procedures relating to the relevant activities of the undertaking:
  - 12 existing indents
  - the existence of the security plan indicated in 1.10.3.2.

#### **Chapter 1.10 Security Provisions**

**NOTE:** For the purposes of this Chapter, security means measures or precautions to be taken to minimise theft or misuse of dangerous goods that may endanger persons, property or the environment.

#### 1.10.1 General provisions

- 1.10.1.1 All persons engaged in the carriage of dangerous goods shall consider the security requirements set out in this Chapter commensurate with their responsibilities.
- 1.10.1.2 Dangerous goods shall only be offered for carriage to carriers that have been appropriately identified.
- 1.10.1.3 Areas within temporary storage terminals, temporary storage sites, vehicle depots, berthing areas and marshalling yards used for the temporary storage during carriage of dangerous goods shall be properly secured, well lit and, where possible and appropriate, not accessible to the general public.
- 1.10.1.4 Each crew member of a vehicle carrying dangerous goods shall carry with them means of identification, which includes their photograph, during carriage.
- 1.10.1.5 Safety inspections in accordance with 1.8.1 and 7.5.1.1 shall cover appropriate security measures.
- 1.10.1.6 The competent authority shall maintain up-to-date registers of all valid training certificates for drivers stipulated in 8.2.1 issued by it or by any recognized organization.

### 1.10.2 Security training

- 1.10.2.1 The training and the refresher training specified in Chapter 1.3 shall also include elements of security awareness. The security refresher training need not be linked to regulatory changes only.
- 1.10.2.2 Security awareness training shall address the nature of security risks, recognising security risks, methods to address and reduce such risks and actions to be taken in the event of a security breach. It shall include awareness of security plans (if

appropriate) commensurate with the responsibilities and duties of individuals and their part in implementing security plans.

#### 1.10.3 Provisions for high consequence dangerous goods

1.10.3.1 "High consequence dangerous goods" are those which have the potential for misuse in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction. The list of high consequence dangerous goods is provided in Table 1.10.5.

#### 1.10.3.2 Security plans

- 1.10.3.2.1 Carriers, consignors and other participants specified in 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 engaged in the carriage of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5) shall adopt, implement and comply with a security plan that addresses at least the elements specified in 1.10.3.2.2.
- 1.10.3.2.2 The security plan shall comprise at least the following elements:
  - (a) specific allocation of responsibilities for security to competent and qualified persons with appropriate authority to carry out their responsibilities;
  - (b) records of dangerous goods or types of dangerous goods concerned;
  - (c) review of current operations and assessment of security risks, including any stops necessary to the transport operation, the keeping of dangerous goods in the vehicle, tank or container before, during and after the journey and the intermediate temporary storage of dangerous goods during the course of intermodal transfer or trans-shipment between units;
  - (d) clear statement of measures that are to be taken to reduce security risks, commensurate with the responsibilities and duties of the participant, including:
    - training;
    - security policies (e.g. response to higher threat conditions, new employee/employment verification, etc.);
    - operating practices (e.g. choice/use of routes where known, access to dangerous goods in intermediate temporary storage (as defined in (c)), proximity to vulnerable infrastructure etc.);
    - equipment and resources that are to be used to reduce security risks;
  - (e) effective and up to date procedures for reporting and dealing with security threats, breaches of security or security incidents;
  - (f) procedures for the evaluation and testing of security plans and procedures for periodic review and update of the plans;
  - (g) measures to ensure the physical security of transport information contained in the security plan; and
  - (h) measures to ensure that the distribution of information relating to the transport operation contained in the security plan is limited to those who need to have it. Such measures shall not preclude the provision of information required elsewhere in ADR.

**NOTE:** Carriers, consignors and consignees should co-operate with each other and with competent authorities to exchange threat information, apply appropriate security measures and respond to security incidents.

1.10.3.3 Devices, equipment or arrangements to prevent the theft of the vehicle carrying high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5) or its cargo, shall be applied and measures taken to ensure that these are operational and effective at all times. The application of these protective measures shall not jeopardize emergency response.

**NOTE:** When appropriate and already fitted, the use of transport telemetry or other tracking methods or devices should be used to monitor the movement of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5).

- 1.10.4 In accordance with the provisions of 1.1.3.6, the requirements of 1.10.1, 1.10.2, 1.10.3 and 8.1.2.1 (d) do not apply when the quantities carried in packages on a transport unit do not exceed those referred to in 1.1.3.6.3. In addition, the requirements of 1.10.1, 1.10.2, 1.10.3 and 8.1.2.1 (d) do not apply when the quantities carried in tanks or in bulk on a transport unit do not exceed those referred to in 1.1.3.6.3.
- 1.10.5 High consequence dangerous goods are those listed in the table below and carried in quantities greater than those indicated therein.

Table 1.10.5: List of high consequence dangerous goods

Class	Division	Substance or article	Quantity			
			Tank (/)	Bulk (kg)	Packages (kg)	
1	1.1	Explosives	а	а	0	
	1.2	Explosives	а	а	0	
	1.3	Compatibility group C explosives	а	а	0	
	1.5	Explosives	0	а	0	
2		Flammable gases (classification codes including only the letter F)	3000	а	b	
		Toxic gases (classification codes including letters T, TF, TC, TO, TFC or TOC) excluding aerosols	0	а	0	
3		Flammable liquids of packing groups I and II	3000	а	b	
		Desensitized explosives	а	а	0	
4.1		Desensitized explosives	а	а	0	
4.2		Packing group I substances	3000	а	b	
4.3		Packing group I substances	3000	а	b	
5.1		Oxidizing liquids of packing group I	3000	а	b	
		Perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers	3000	3000	b	
6.1		Toxic substances of packing group I	0	а	0	
6.2		Infectious substances of Category A	а	а	0	
7		Radioactive material		A <sub>1</sub> (special form) or 3000 A <sub>2</sub> , as plicable, in Type B or Type C packages		
8		Corrosive substances of packing group I	3000	а	b	

a Not relevant.

**NOTE:** For purposes of non-proliferation of nuclear material the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material applies to international transport supported by IAEA INFCIRC/225(Rev.4).

#### 8.1.2 Documents to be carried on the transport unit:

8.1.2.1 "(d) Means of identification, which include a photograph, for each crew member, in accordance with 1.10.1.4.

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The provisions of 1.10.3 do not apply, whatever the quantity is.